Introduction
How do citizens in developing countries access public services? Access to basic utilities has become a popular measure of good governance among social scientists (Adserà, Boix, & Payne, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999) . In particular, scholars of Mexico evaluate government performance by measuring citizen access to water, sanitation and electricity. Hiskey (2003) analyzes access to these three utilities as a measure of government accountability in two Mexican states, Michoacan and Jalisco. Diaz Cayeros, Estevez, & Magaloni (forthcoming) also analyze access to water and sanitation to study the impact of social service programs. evaluates improvements in water and sanitation access across Mexican municipal governments to study the impact of civic participation on government performance. However, governments are not the sole providers of basic utilities. Non-state providers, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for-profit organizations, and even revolutionary movements, have been offering access to water and drainage throughout the developing world in places as diverse as Bangladesh, India, South Africa, Kenya, and Ethiopia. 1 We ask whether migrants, by sending money back to their communities, also facilitate "non-state provision" of basic utilities. Migrants have been sending money to their hometowns for decades. 2 Since the mid-1990s, these direct money transfers, known as remittances, skyrocketed worldwide. In 2006, remittances globally totaled $204 billion, double the amount of development assistance, and 62 percent more than in 2004 (World Bank, 2007; World Bank, 2005) . Remittances sometimes exceed combined official development assistance and foreign direct investment (Inter-American Development Bank, 2006) . In 2005, remittances constituted 13 percent of GDP in the Philippines, nearly 20 percent of GDP in El Salvador, Jamaica, Honduras, Nicaragua and Haiti, 10 percent in the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Belize and Bolivia, and, in Mexico and Colombia, 3 and 5 percent respectively. 3 Remittances therefore represent a substantial influx of income to developing countries. In fact, they even surpass government spending in some localities. In the Mexican state of Guanajuato, which received $652.30 million in remittances in 1996, more than any other Mexican state that year, remittance income was 14 times greater than federal social spending (Zarate-Hoyos, 2004, pp. 556-7) .
These large monetary flows and their potential impact on development and social outcomes have not escaped attention. For decades, scholars have been investigating the impact of remittances on economic development. 4 Initially, scholars were skeptical of any positive longterm development impact of these flows and argued that remittances, at worst, increased recipients' dependency on a foreign source of income. 5 At best, recipients only used them toward consumption, such as home construction, food, clothing, cars, and so forth. 6 More recently, Durand, Parrado & Massey (1996) argue that remittances could positively impact development despite being spent on consumption because they support local markets, and because migrants might also invest them in productive activities, such as purchasing farm equipment or investing in local manufacturers. Consistent with Durand, Parrado & Massey (1996) , research finds that remittances contribute to productive activities and social well-being in both cross-national and country-specific studies, ranging from Mexico and Central America to Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan, India, the Philippines and even Somaliland. Their results suggest that remittances increase investment, reduce poverty, improve school enrollment, reduce illiteracy, and reduce infant mortality.
7
Most relevant for our analysis, researchers have found through primarily qualitative studies that remittances develop local infrastructure, especially projects typically associated with governmental service provision, such as road improvements or drainage systems. For example, Mexican migrant organizations in the United States, known as Hometown Associations (HTAs), pool remittances, through dances, raffles and so forth, explicitly to fund these types of services (Orozco & Lapointe, 2004; Leiken, 2000) . water, clinics and schools" (Chaudhry, 1989, p. 115) . With remittance income, migrants and non-migrants become "non-state providers" of public services.
Our article offers statistical evidence that remittances fund household access to basic utilities. We disaggregate data on household access to clean water and drainage from the Mexican Census to measure whether and how households access these utilities. We then test how non-migrants spend remittances to improve their social well-being by separating out improvements in infrastructure that citizens are likely to build for themselves (household-driven methods of access) from infrastructure provided by the government (government-driven methods of access). We find that remittances empower households to develop technology to access public utilities.
Our findings call into question whether aggregate measures of access to public services used in existing work on government accountability in Mexico and beyond adequately capture government performance. The literature assumes that access to public services means access provided by the government and measures access without unpacking the technology linking households to public infrastructure. However, governments can "provide" public services to households either directly through public infrastructure or indirectly because households themselves compensate for insufficient government infrastructure. Disaggregating households' method of access allows us to unpack the technology linking households and public provision.
By uncovering determinants of household-driven and government-driven access to public utilities, we demonstrate that aggregate measures obfuscate the complex infrastructure of access.
Moreover, our results reveal that these public services are not "public goods", as the literature tends to claim (see, for example, Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, & Magaloni, forthcoming; Habyarimana et al., 2007) . 9 By definition, public goods are non-excludable and non-rivalrous.
Access to water would represent access to a public good, for example, if the government could not exclude anyone from obtaining water and one citizen's access would not limit another's.
However, if access to water depends on households' technology of access, then water is an excludable good and therefore not a public good.
In what follows, we offer a micro-level explanation for how non-migrants use remittances to improve access to clean water and sanitation. In the third section, we test empirically whether remittances improve access to public services through private means of access by analyzing the impact of remittances on access to drainage and clean water across
Mexican municipalities between 1995 and 2000. We find that remittances positively affect changes in household-driven access as well as changes at the aggregate level, suggesting that migrants are important "non-state providers" of basic utilities and that aggregate improvements in coverage are driven in part by increases in household-driven methods of access.
Why remittances might improve access to public services
The literature on remittances and development demonstrates that remittances fuel economic development because recipients stimulate local markets by spending their income on consumption and because non-migrants invest small amounts of their remittances in local productive activities. This research, however, has yet to isolate the link between remittances and access to basic utilities. 10 We offer a micro-level explanation for how remittances promote access to clean water and sanitation.
We focus on clean water and sanitation for three reasons. First, recent studies on governmental accountability in Mexico explain variation in governmental provision of these two services. By investigating the impact of remittances on household access to clean water and sanitation, our study engages with leading scholarship on government performance in Mexico.
Second, the lack of clean water and sanitation constitute important attributes of poverty and explaining variation in their provision could improve our understanding of how nongovernmental institutions affect community well-being. Dirty water kills two million people worldwide annually through diseases like diarrhea. 11 Since individuals become sick by drinking or touching water that touched waste, the combination of dirty water and poor drainage is lethal (Kremer, Miguel, & Zwane, 2006) . As Fry, Mihelcic, & Watkins (2008) report, efforts that improve both water and sanitation systems are best at reducing the incidence of waterborne illness. Explaining household access to clean water and drainage systems, therefore, is critical to explaining health and sanitation in a community.
Third, remittances can finance household needs like clean water and drainage. The literature indicates that non-migrants spend an important fraction of their remittance income on home construction and improvements . The impact of remittances on basic infrastructure is therefore more likely to manifest itself through household improvements than through improvements in roads, schools or parks, which scholars also cite as services funded by remittance income. Even if such data existed at the sub-national level, the impact of family remittances would likely be smaller and more difficult to detect.
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How do we expect remittances to improve access to clean water and sanitation? Crossnational surveys show that non-migrants consume much of the remittance money they receive. In Mexico, they consume as much as 90 percent of their remittances on home improvements and basic necessities, like food, medicine, or clothing. (as opposed to dirt). They also tend to be larger, with four or five rooms instead of 1 to 3 and to have more appliances..." (Parrado, 2004, p. 73) .
Although the literature demonstrates that non-migrants spend remittances on home improvements, analyses so far have focused on bigger houses, more rooms and better materials.
These improvements could also include the building of infrastructure for access to clean water and sanitation. In other words, remittances could impact the well-being of communities if they empower citizens to access cleaner water and better sanitation systems.
Households in Mexico access clean water mainly through indoor pipes or a communal tap. They eliminate sewerage mainly by draining it into septic tanks, the public sewerage system, bodies of water, or by dumping it on public lands. 14 We refer to these methods of access as household-driven, government-driven, or driven by a combination of both, based on household and government contributions to the technology of access to these utilities. Access is householddriven if households contribute all or part of the infrastructure used to access the utility. It is government-driven if households do not contribute any infrastructure to access the utility, and use existing government infrastructure instead. 15 When the government offers some of the infrastructure and households complement it with their own technology, access depends on both the government and citizens.
Among these common methods of access to water and drainage in Mexico, only one method excludes government involvement altogether and is therefore entirely household driven.
Citizens obtain access to sewerage without government involvement if they purchase septic tanks. When citizens use septic tanks, the government provides no infrastructure for the disposal of the household sewerage.
The analogous technology to septic tanks for water is wells, but few citizens use wells because wells have been drying up. 16 Instead, households invest in their own access to water by building pipes that connect their homes to the public system. Similarly, citizens can connect indoor pipes to the public sewerage system to complement government provision of sanitation.
We consider these methods of access as complementary to government provision because the municipal government is responsible for the public system of water and sewerage pipes, including protection from floods and management of treatment plants. But for households to access water or sewerage from the public system, they need to build their own pipes.
A third mode of access is when public utilities are entirely provided by government infrastructure. In Mexico, access to water is entirely government-driven when citizens access water through communal taps. Households that utilize this method of access do not invest in infrastructure to bring water into their homes. They use existing infrastructure provided by the government. There is no parallel method in drainage.
In sum, access to sanitation is either entirely household-driven (septic tanks) or driven by a combination of household and government provision (connections to the public sewerage system). Access to water is either entirely government-driven (common taps) or driven by a combination of household and government provision (connections to the public water system).
We expect that the additional household income from remittances improves household-driven access or access that complements government infrastructure. For access to sanitation, this means purchasing a septic tank or connecting to the municipal system of public pipes. For access to clean water in one's home, this means connecting to the municipal system of public pipes.
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Additionally, we investigate whether the effect of remittances is observed on aggregate indicators of access to water and sanitation. Such an effect would suggest that remittances prompt greater household-driven access or increase complementary access where both government and citizens invest in improvements in the provision of public utilities. In either case, an effect of remittances on aggregate measures of access would indicate that remittances significantly empower households to improve their access to clean water and sanitation.
Although we expect a positive relationship between remittances and access to services that improve communal well-being, remittances could instead have no effect, or even a negative effect, on access to these utilities. Remittances could decrease access to water and sanitation because their appeal induces mass migration. 18 In this case, remittances would be creating ghost towns where citizens and governments lack incentives to invest in local infrastructure. 19 In sum, remittances could either positively or negatively affect access to basic household needs. We argue that they are likely to improve access because citizens use remittances to develop the infrastructure privately in their homes.
Empirical Analysis
We evaluate the impact of remittances on access to utilities in hometown communities by estimating a model that explains the change in access to clean water and sanitation between 1995 We use this measure of emigration as a proxy for remittances in this article, similar to Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni & Weingast (2003) , for two reasons. These studies use municipal governments as their unit of analysis instead of state governments because Mexico's more than 2,000 municipalities constitute a large sample size. Furthermore, Mexico's Constitution calls on municipal governments to provide local public utilities.
Our analysis consists of twelve causal variables including our proxy for remittances. The dependent variables, Septic and IndoorDrainage, and IndoorWater represent respectively the change between 1995 and 2000 in household access to drainage through a septic tank, household access to drainage through indoor pipes, and household access to clean water through indoor pipes. These methods of access require private investment: if remittances empower households to improve their own technologies of access, we would observe this effect on household access to sanitation through septic tanks or indoor drainage, and to clean water through indoor pipes. 2000, the proportion of households accessing drainage through a septic tank increased by close to one percentage point, the proportion of households accessing drainage through indoor pipes increased by nearly three percentage points, and the proportion of households accessing clean water through indoor pipes increased by close to five percentage points.
[ Literate, will positively impact the change in household access to clean water through indoor pipes and to drainage through septic tanks and indoor pipes.
We also control for two indicators of democratic institutions to account for the possibility that more democratic municipalities enjoy greater access to drainage and clean water because they hold their governments more accountable. For example, Hiskey (2003) argues that greater electoral competitiveness increases rates of coverage. argues that greater voter turnout positively affects rates of coverage. We control for the former with PRIShare, which captures the difference in vote share for the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) between local elections in the mid-1990s and local elections in the late-1990s: the greater the vote share, the greater the PRI monopoly, the less competitive the municipal election. 24 We (Weldon & Molinar, 1994) . 27 We control for both effects with party dummies that take the value "1" if the municipality was controlled by, respectively, the PRI, the National Action Party (PAN), or the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) for at least six years during the 1990s, and zero otherwise.
Fourth, we account for social determinants of coverage in basic household needs using a measure of demographic change and a measure for the presence of indigenous populations. Fifth, we include the initial level of the household access to the utility to account for the fact that a percentage-point increase in access may be easier when a municipality has a lower baseline level of coverage because localities might catch up to one another socio-economically over time. We therefore control for a conditional convergence effect (Diaz Cayeros, Estevez, & Magaloni forthcoming). If it exists, municipalities with higher initial rates of coverage will experience less change in coverage in the five years we study. 29 Finally, we perform three robustness checks to verify the consistency of our results. First, we add state-fixed effects to account for state-specific factors that we may not capture with our controls or observe otherwise. For example, some state governments are more involved in the provision of clean water for their municipalities than others (World Bank, 2005) . The second test accounts for the influence of outliers using Hadi's method for identifying multiple outliers in multivariate data (Hadi, 1994) . Models that study the impact of remittances are particularly vulnerable to outliers since remittances tend to concentrate geographically in a few states (Zarate-Hoyos 2004, p. 557) . Finally, we perform all of our tests again on levels of access rather We test this claim by estimating the change between 1995 and 2000 in aggregate household access to drainage and in aggregate household access to clean water. We use the same model, include the same controls, and perform the same robustness checks as our initial estimations. Our results indicate that those municipalities receiving more remittances between 1995 and 2000 experience larger improvements in aggregate access to drainage. We find, however, no significant impact of remittances on improvements in clean water coverage between 1995 and 2000. The interpretation of the result on drainage is straightforward: remittances increase aggregate household access to drainage because more households turn to septic tanks for their drainage when remittances increase.
Why do we not see the same improvement with water? We investigate this result by estimating the variation in access to clean water through a communal tap, for which the government is the sole provider. Although access to clean water through communal taps actually decreased from 62 percent in 1995 to 55 percent in 2000, it nonetheless constitutes nearly twothirds of all access to clean water. We follow the same model, include the same controls and perform the same robustness checks from our original estimations.
Our results indicate that remittances have a significant negative effect on improvements in household access to clean water through a communal tap between 1995 and 2000. This effect is significant in six of the eight specifications (and in 22 of our 24 alternative specification tests), and is interesting for two reasons. First, it explains the non-finding on the aggregate measure of household access to clean water: if remittances are associated with increases in access to clean water through indoor pipes but with decreases in access to clean water through a communal tap (the two most common methods of household access to clean water), then the effect of remittances on the aggregate variable should be null. Second, the findings on indoor pipes and communal taps suggest a possible substitution effect between the two methods. The data we present are consistent with a story of remittances financing a transition from household access to clean water from a standpipe in a shared compound, to household access to clean water privately, through pipes within the home.
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In sum, at an aggregate level, remittances positively affect access to drainage because they raise household-driven access to septic tanks, and households increasingly turn to septic tanks for access to sanitation. However, remittances have no significant effect on access to clean water because they divert access away from purely government-driven access toward a method of access where government and households both contribute to the provision of clean water.
Migrants, therefore, not only fund access to water and sanitation, but also change the way these utilities are accessed in Mexican municipalities.
Conclusion
We disaggregated municipal-level data on access to clean water and sanitation to test systematically the effect of remittances on the well-being of Mexican households. We build on the literature on the development impact of remittances by providing evidence of a micro-level mechanism between remittances and factors that improve health. Municipalities that receive more remittances improve their household-driven technologies of access to clean water and drainage. Moreover, because households play an increasing role in building their own technology
of access, we demonstrate that the breadth of remittances' impact on the well-being of hometown communities is significant and increasing.
Our results further indicate that political and social effects on coverage are sensitive to the type of utility as well as to the method of access. For example, public expenditures through municipal government spending and through FISM have a positive effect on clean water coverage, but a more complicated impact on sanitation, depending on the method of access to drainage. These divergent results suggest that access to basic household needs involves strategies that vary with the type of utility. Disaggregated analyses, like the one in this article, can yield a greater understanding of the strategies used by local governments, migrants and minorities for improving the well-being of hometown communities.
Disaggregated analyses can also advance existing studies of government performance that assume the government is the sole or primary provider of access to basic utilities. If improvements in access to water and drainage reflect citizen action more than governmental 30 Whether we specify a change-on-change, level-on-level, or change-on-level model, our results hold. Results are available upon request. 31 We calculated values on the dependent variables for different values of Remittances using Clarify and holding all other control variables at their mean or median. We then transformed the values on the dependent variables back to odds-ratios. The values on the vertical axis are therefore percent changes, between 1995 and 2000, in the odds of accessing drainage through a septic tank (1a) or clean water through indoor pipes (1b). 32 We also specified a model with a squared Indigenous variable to test whether the impact of an indigenous presence in a municipality might be curvilinear. We find that this curvilinear effect exists only for access to sanitation through septic tanks: municipalities with very low and very high proportions of indigenous populations see lower access to sanitation through septic tanks.
Furthermore, this specification does not change our main results on remittances. 33 Although there are 2,438 municipalities in Mexico, our sample sizes range from 1,232 to 1,597. Similar to Cleary's analysis, we exclude a number of municipalities because they are missing data on some of our control variables, including public finance, electoral and indigenous population variables. When we estimate the full model with robust standard errors, state fixed effects and imputed data, our results hold. 34 The disaggregated water and drainage variables on which we performed our regressions add up to the aggregate measures of household access to clean water and sanitation, meaning that the equations we estimate may not be independent of one another. To control for the possibility that the errors may be correlated across each regression, we estimate a Seemingly Unrelated
Regression model. We find that our results hold for water and weaken for drainage.
